Mechanisms of Social Control - 8
Kohlberg and his followers presented a number of studies, including cross-cultural comparisons with a number of nations, to support this model (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Miller & Bersoff, 1992). I think it would be worthwhile to examine these stages and levels not only in terms of developmental psychology, but in exploring various peoples and cultures and how they respond to mechanisms of social control. In Table 4, I have tried to draw a parallel between Kohlberg's stages and the bases of power that might operate most effectively at each level. Some of the parallels are quite clear: Those with a "Punishment and Obedience Orientation" would be more likely to response to impersonal coercive power and reward power. Those with an "Interpersonal Concordance Orientation" would be more likely to respond to personal coercion and personal reward, plus, perhaps, referent power. "Social System Maintenance" seems to suggest particularly legitimate position power and legitimate power of equity. "Social Contract Orientation" parallels the legitimate power of reciprocity. And "Universal Ethical Principles Orientation" implies an amenity toward informational power, particularly information that shows a relationship between the desirable behavior and the target's basic moral values.
Kohlberg's model of moral stages has certainly had great impact in psychology, education, and religion. It does not quite seem so well universally accepted today, though it still has its devotees, as in a recent work by Reed (1997). Gilligan (1982) specifically felt that Kohlberg's system had a built-in gender bias, and really represented a masculine, rather than a feminine orientation. Paloutzian (1996, p. 94) suggests that the system has a political bias in favor of Western democratic liberalism. There are also questions about the universality of the stages that he proposed. Unfortunately, the research depends too much on the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire, in which the items themselves might have a cultural bias. It would be nice to see research on moral choices that focused more on how power and influence strategies determined appropriate behavior. I, personally, have some intuitive questions about whether the stages are ordered as Kohlberg presents them, particularly if we look at adults in different societies and cultures, rather than children of different ages. But it still makes sense that there are differences among people and peoples in terms of moral reasoning, and in terms of what forms of influence, which bases of power, are most effective. And we can take that position without saying anything about the intrinsic superiority of one stage over another. One can well imagine that a social influence process that is meant to work with people who operate with Kohlberg calls a Universal Ethical Principles Orientation will not work for those who think in terms of Punishment and Obedience. And, by the same token, we can all probably think of examples in which people who would listen to an argument for doing something because it is right and proper would rebel against an order to do the same thing that threatens punishment. And what happens, then, when religious works, which were prepared for a people who were presumed to respond only to promises of reward or threats of punishment, are retained without modification at a later time, when people are more attuned to appeals of legitimacy of equity, or to value-related information orientation?
Modern-Day Difficulties in Accepting Supreme Coercive and Legitimate Power
It is understandable that in a modern age, some might be inclined to reject entirely the orthodox notions of religion, with an all-powerful and sometimes vengeful Deity, a form of religion developed in a preliterate, much less sophisticated age, but which is then frozen and impermeable to changes resulting from knowledge acquired in later years. As in social influence processes in general, it is painful and restricting of one's sense of independence and individualism to have to succumb to extreme coercive power, or to become dependent on reward power, or to be subjected continuously to the guilt of stronger forms of legitimate equity, legitimate position, or legitimate reciprocity power. Karen Armstrong, who had spent seven years as a Roman Catholic nun in a traditional order, describes such feelings very vividly:
Those of us who have had a difficult time with religion in the past find it liberating to be rid of the God who terrorized our childhood. It is wonderful not to have to cower before a vengeful deity, who threatens us with eternal damnation if we do not abide by his rules. We have a new intellectual freedom and can boldly follow up our own ideas without pussyfooting around difficult articles of faith, feeling all the while a sinking loss of integrity. (Armstrong, 1993, p. 378)
But she goes on to say that the hideous deity that describes is not necessarily the only way one can practice and understand one's religion. She does accept the possibility that for some people such a religious outlook might be more effective, not only as a means of social control, but in giving the adherent a sense of security, a structured life, and the support of a number of other adherents who feel similarly. For those of us who have a need for a logical, informational power system for determining our behavior or sense of morality, within or without religion, it is important for us to understand that it is entirely appropriate that others structure their lives and their religion in more traditional ways - so long as in doing so they do not restrict the rights of others.
There have been many times in history when there have been movements away from a religion with a literal punishment/obedience orientation to religions with an approach that emphasizes ethical principles with an informational orientation. In Islam there were such teachers as Mulla Sadra in Iran (1571-1640), who placed greater emphasis on informational power. Knowledge, he said, was not simply a matter of acquiring information but a process of transformation. He saw heaven and the divine to be discovered within oneself. In the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1896) "dismissed many of the trappings of religion, such as the dogmatic authority of the churches, prayer and ritual, which prevented human beings from relying upon their own prayers and encouraged them to depend upon Another." However, he still viewed God as a strategy that enables us to function more efficiently and with greater morality, but people still needed a governor who would reward virtue with happiness (Armstrong, 1993, pp. 314-315). In Europe, some Jewish scholars were influenced by Kant's thinking, who then tended to emphasize basic moral responsibility, which could be discussed and argued. These included the German philosopher, Moses Mendelssohn, the grandfather of musician Felix Mendelssohn, and Baruch Spinoza, in Holland, whom we discussed above. In many cases, such people were condemned as "freethinkers," or worse, by traditional religious authorities, ostracized and punished, sometimes very severely. We discussed earlier similar treatment of Maimonides in the twelfth century (see note 8, p. 178).
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